In this paper I discuss one application of a theory whose general features have been presented elsewhere. 1 The core of this theory is a formalism, with well-defined syntax and (model-theoretic) semantics, for the representation of propositional attitudes, complex mental states consisting of several connected attitudes, attitudinal change (i.e. the change from one attitudinal state to another), and attitudes shared by several agents. A second, though closely related purpose of the formalism is that it can serve as part of a semantics of attitude attributing sentences of natural language. In designing the formalism special attention was given to the internal connections between the contents of different attitudes. In the context of attitude attribution these connections manifest themselves as problems for the semantics of discourses consisting of several attitude attribution sentences, which either attribute different attitudes to the same agent at the same time, or different attitudes to the same agent at different times, or attitudes to different agents at the same or different times.
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The one example to which the present paper is devoted is a "mini-discourse" consisting of two sentences which ascribe attitudinal changes to the same agent at two distinct times. The example illustrates two recurrent features of multi-sentence attitude attributing discourses. On the one hand it exemplifies the by now familiar fact that in a sequence of two or more 1 See Kamp (1990 Kamp ( , 2003 ; Kamp et al. (2011 attitude attributions the later attributions tend to rely for their interpretation on the attributions which precede them. This is a phenomenon that also arises when the attributions concern one and the same time (as well as one and the same agent) and it is for such cases that it has been identified and discussed in the literature.
2 But in addition the example illustrates a number of issues that have to do with temporal reference and time. Some of these arise at the level of the single sentence. This is true in particular of the question how the tenses of the complement clauses of attitude attributing matrix verbs are semantically related to the tenses of the matrix verbs themselves. But there are also time-related questions that concern the way in which the two attitude attributing sentences are connected, as parts of a single cohesive piece of discourse. On the one hand these have to do with the circumstance that the sentences of our example attribute attitudinal changes and on the other with the fact that these changes are said to have occurred at different times. These temporal issues add a new dimension to the general problem how earlier attributions can provide interpretation contexts for later ones.
The theory which I will apply to the example of the paper is an extension of Discourse Representation Theory as it is presented in for instance Kamp & Reyle (1993) . More accurately it is a combination of two extensions. One of these concerns the representation of attitudinal states and the semantics of that part of language which is used to describe such states; the other is presupposition. This second extension too has been presented elsewhere.
3
Abridged presentations of both extensions can be found in Kamp et al. (2011) .
I will assume some basic knowledge of DRT, roughly corresponding to Chapters 1, 2 and 5 of Kamp & Reyle (1993) . But in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 below I give brief introductions to the two mentioned extensions, which should give the reader enough to understand the treatment that follows in Section 4 of the example that this paper is about. The remaining sections of the paper are all quite short. Section 2 presents the example and lists the problems connected with it on which we will focus. Section 5 sums up and restates the principal morals.
